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TORT LIABILITY FOR CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES: TIME FOR A CHANGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Under California law, a public health entity is not legally re-
sponsible for its decision to release a mental patient unless the court
finds that an employee of the facility was negligent in securing the
patient's release.' In contrast, according to federal law, the United
States Government is liable for such conduct to the same extent as a
private party would be in similar circumstances.' For example, fed-
eral courts often impose liability for violence committed by a released
mental patient on the basis of an unreasonably dangerous activity,
the existence of a special relationship between patient and institu-
tion, or foreseeability of harm.8 California courts, on the other hand,
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1. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 820.2, 856(c)(3) (West 1980). Section 856 of the California
Government Code states, in pertinent part:
(a) Neither a public entity nor a public employee acting within the scope of his
employment is liable for any injury resulting from determining in accordance
with any applicable enactment:
(1) Whether to confine a person for mental illness or addiction.
(2) The terms and conditions of confinement for mental illness or addiction.
(3) Whether to parole, grant a leave of absence to, or release a person
confined for mental illness or addiction.
(b) A public employee is not liable for carrying out with due care a determina-
tion described in subdivision (a).
(c) Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury
proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful act or omission in carrying out
or failing to carry out:
(1) A determination to confine or not to confine a person for mental illness
or addiction.
(2) The terms or conditions of confinement of a person for mental illness or
addiction.
(3) A determination to parole, grant a leave of absence to, or release a
person confined for mental illness or addiction.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 856 (West 1980) (emphasis added).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982). Section 2674 states, in relevant part: "The United
States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not
be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
Tort claims against federal psychiatric facilities are almost always brought under this code
section.
3. See, e.g., Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956); Williams v. United
States, 450 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1978); Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir.
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.have refused to find negligent conduct on the part of mental health
employees, and thus have not imposed liability. The inconsistency
between California and federal law necessitates a re-examination of
the California position.
This comment will explore the differences in reasoning between
California and federal decisions, focusing on the theory that the Cal-
ifornia Tort Claims Act," as currently interpreted by the judiciary,
leaves victims of mental health patients inadequately compensated
for their injuries. Section II of the comment will first discuss two
California Supreme Court decisions that prompted the California
Legislature to pass the California Tort Claims Act and will explain
relevant portions of the Act. Then, section II will summarize a Cali-
fornia case not directly on point but which contains reasoning that
has been applied to decisions concerning public mental health facili-
ties. That section will finally describe typical decisions involving the
mental health field made by both California and federal courts. Sec-
tion III of this comment will analyze the factual settings of Califor-
nia cases as they would have been decided under federal law. Section
IV proposes a new standard for imposing liability on public mental
health facilities in California.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Tort Claims Act
In 1963, in an attempt to codify existing California law, the
California Legislature passed the Tort Claims Act (the Act)." The
Act arose in response to two California Supreme Court decisions6
that threatened to abrogate sovereign immunity,' the primary doc-
trine relied upon by government entities to avoid legal liability. The
Act prohibits any California mental health facility from being held
liable for the release of a patient whose subsequent actions cause
another to be harmed.8
Prior to 1961, the dominant trend in California was towards a
1975). See infra notes 147-229 and accompanying text.
4. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1980).
5. Id.
6. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1961); Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1961).
7. Sovereign immunity: "Doctrine [that] precludes litigant from asserting an otherwise
meritorious cause of action against a sovereign or a party with sovereign attributes unless
sovereign consents to suit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979).
8. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 854-856.6 (West 1980).
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departure from total adherence to the sovereign immunity doctrine.
This was evidenced both legislatively' and judicially."0 Two Califor-
nia cases in particular attracted the attention of government
employees.
In Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District,1 the plaintiff was a
patient at Corning Memorial Hospital." She brought suit against
the hospital alleging that she re-injured her hip in a fall brought
about by the hospital's negligence." The hospital demurred, seeking
immunity as a state agency exercising a governmental function. 4
Using bold new language, the court stated that the rule of govern-
mental immunity for tort is "an anachronism, without rational basis,
and has existed only by the force of inertia. . . .None of the rea-
sons for its continuance can withstand analysis." 5 However, the
Muskopf court retained the well-settled rule that although govern-
ment officials are themselves liable for the negligent performance of
ministerial duties, they are immune from tort liability for discretion-
ary acts within the scope of their authority.' The court concluded,
"in holding that the doctrine of governmental immunity for torts for
which its agents are liable has no place in our law we make no
startling break from the past . . .trend." '
In Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School,"3 a superintendent
of a school district brought suit against the district, three trustees, the
county superintendent, and the district attorney for maliciously dis-
crediting her reputation and forcing her out of her job." The court
upheld the rule of discretionary immunity, stating that all defendants
were immune from liability in view of the discretionary nature of
their acts.20 One rationale behind the discretionary immunity doc-
trine is that the threat of trial and the danger of its outcome would
impair workers' performances on the job. The court decided that it is
9. Justice Traynor pointed out: "For years the process of erosion of governmental im-
munity has gone on unabated. The Legislature has contributed mightily to that erosion." Mus-
kopf, 55 Cal. 2d at 221, 359 P.2d at 463, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
10. Id. at 219, 359 P.2d at 461-62, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94; see generally 5 CAL. LAW
REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 11, 219-30 (1963).
11. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
12. Id. at 213, 359 P.2d at 458, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 213, 359 P.2d at 458, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
15. Id. at 216, 359 P.2d at 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
16. Id. at 220, 359 P.2d at 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 221, 359 P.2d at 463, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
18. 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
19. Id. at 228, 359 P.2d at 466, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
20. Id. at 230, 233-35, 359 P.2d at 468-70, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 100-02.
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better to leave the injured party unredressed than to subject govern-
ment employees to the constant threat of suit.21
The controversy that resulted from Lipman was focused on its
dicta. The dicta stated that it was unlikely that workers' individual
performances would be adversely affected by the threat that their
public entity, as opposed to themselves, might be held liable for dam-
ages.22 Thus, a primary rationale behind sovereign liability was
questioned. The court stated:
The community benefits from official action taken without fear
of personal liability, and it would be unjust in some circum-
stances to require an individual injured by official wrongdoing
to bear the burden of his loss rather than distribute it through-
out the community. . . . [Viarious factors furnish a means of
deciding whether the agency in a particular case should have
immunity, such as the importance to the public of the function
involved, the extent to which governmental liability might im-
pair free exercise of the function, and the availability to individ-
uals affected of remedies other than tort suits for damages."
The decision in Muskopf and the dicta of Lipman evidently
caused apprehension among officials in government-run agencies,
who feared that public entities might become subject to a liability
burden they could not bear financially.24 In response, the California
Legislature immediately enacted section 22.3 of the California Civil
Code,25 which delayed the effectiveness of the decisions until the
close of the 1963 legislative session. In 1963, the Legislature for-
mally enacted the Tort Claims Act.
B. The Tort Claims Act
Senate Bill 42, commonly referred to as the Tort Claims Act,
adopted the recommendations of the California Law Revision Com-
mission regarding sovereign immunity. 26 The Act encompassed
claims and actions against both public entities and public employees
21. Id. at 229, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
22. Id. at 229-30, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
23. Id. at 230, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
24. Note, Notes on the California Tort Claims Act, The Discretionary Immunity Doc-
trine in California, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 561, 562 (1968).
25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.3 (West 1961) (repealed 1979). The section states: "The
doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability is hereby re-enacted as a rule of decision
in the courts of this state . I. " Id.
26. 4 CAL. LAw REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 807




in the following areas: (1) dangerous conditions of public property;
(2) fire protection; (3) medical, hospital, and public health activities;
and (4) tort liability agreements between public entities.
California courts have applied several different sections of the
Act to determine whether liability exists for mental health facilities
in those cases where released patients harm others. Section 856 of
the California Government Code is applicable specifically to mental
health workers.27 As originally drafted, this section of the Act recog-
nized the immunity of public employees for their decisions to con-
fine, parole, or release a patient from a mental institution. 8 The
section did not exonerate public employees for injuries caused by
their negligent or wrongful acts or omissions.29 Many portions of the
original statute have since been repealed or amended." Most impor-
tantly, the current statute now grants immunity to public employees
for their discretionary acts 1 and to public entities for any injury
proximately caused by a mental health patient. 2
Section 820.2 of the Government Code was intended to restate
the law that existed in California prior to Muskopf and Lipman."3
This section mandates that unless otherwise provided by statute, a
public employee is not liable for any discretionary act or omission,
regardless of whether the discretion was abused.3'
The immunity provided public entities by section 854.8 of the
Government Code was intended to prevail over all other sections of
the Act.3" According to this section, the public entity is immune from
suit for injuries to persons committed or admitted to public mental
institutions.3 Even more importantly, the public entity is immune
from liability for injuries proximately caused by persons committed
27. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 856 (West 1980); see supra note 1.
28. Id. § 856. Law Revision Comm'n Comment, 1963 Addition.
29. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 856 (West 1980). Law Revision Commission Comment, 1963
Addition.
30. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1980).
31. Id. § 820.2.
32. Id. § 854.8.
33. Section 820.2 of the California Government Code provides: "Except as otherwise
provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or
omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in
him, whether or not such discretion be abused." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1980); see 4
CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 843 (1963).
34. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1980).
35. Id. § 854.8. The code specifically states, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
this part, . . . a public entity is not liable for: (1) An injury proximately caused by a patient of
a mental institution. (2) An injury to an inpatient of a mental institution." Id.
36. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 854.8(a)(2) (West 1980).
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to mental institutions.87 However, public entities may be required to
pay judgments based on their public employees' malpractice.88
C. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California
Although it concerned the liability of an individual psychiatrist
as opposed to a public mental health facility, the rationale behind
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California89 has been applied in
subsequent decisions concerning malpractice committed by employees
of public facilities.'0 In Tarasoff, a mental health patient confided to
his psychiatrist his intention to murder Tatiana Tarasoff.' 1 Subse-
quently, he did in fact kill her.'2 Tatiana's parents brought suit
against the university, alleging that the university's psychotherapist
was under a duty to warn the victim of the impending danger.4 The
defendants asserted they owed no duty to a third party."
The Tarasoff court acknowledged the general rule that no indi-
vidual has a duty to control the conduct of another.' However, the
majority noted that such a duty can be created if the defendant is in
a special relationship with either the person whose conduct requires
control or with the foreseeable victim of the conduct."' The Tarasoff
court determined that a psychotherapist-patient relationship is suffi-
cient to impose a duty to control the patient's conduct on the psycho-
therapist.' 7 This duty extends to both the patient and to the patient's
foreseeable victims."8 The duty does not require for its fulfillment a
37. Id. § 854.8(a)(1).
38. Id. § 854.8(d).
39. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
40. See, e.g., Buford v. State, 104 Cal. App. 3d 811, 164 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1980);
Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980).
41. 17 Cal. 3d at 430, 551 P.2d at 339, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
42. Id. at 433, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
45. Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
46. Id. (emphasis added). Section 315 of the Restatement reads:
There is no duty to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing bodily harm to another unless, a) a special relation exists between the
actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the
third person's conduct, or b) a special relation exists between the actor and the
other which gives to the other a right to protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). Also relevant is section 319 of the Restate-
ment, which provides: "One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should
know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to control the third person as to prevent him from doing such harm." Id. §
319.
47. 17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
48. Id. at 438-39, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
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"perfect performance" by the psychotherapist.4 9 Rather, the psycho-
therapist need only employ the reasonable degree of skill that others
in the profession would utilize in similar circumstances.5
D. California Law
California courts have not yet held a public mental health facil-
ity or an employee liable for injuries caused by the improvident re-
lease of a patient. They have based their conclusions on (1) the fact
that the release of a patient is a discretionary function, and is there-
fore within the scope of a public employee's duties,5 ' and (2) the lack
of a special relationship between the patient and the facility. 2 The
following cases illustrate this position.
The plaintiffs in two California cases alleged that mental pa-
tients were improperly released due to the negligent maintenance of
their treatment records. Plaintiffs in both cases were denied relief.
The courts in those cases relied on the immunity granted by the Tort
Claims Act. 8 In Kravitz v. State,"' the appellate court held that the
plaintiffs-parents of a child who had died as a result of an attack
by a former mental patient-had failed to state a cause of action.55
In Kravitz, Defendant Nicholas William Toce was committed
to Atascadero State Hospital and subsequently transferred to Metro-
politan State Hospital. 6 Four years after the original commitment,
Metropolitan's superintendent informed the Los Angeles Superior
Court57 that Toce was "no longer insane and has improved to such
an extent that he is no longer a menace to the health and safety of
others."'5' The superintendent recommended a release under section
1026(a) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.59 On the basis of both
49. Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
50. Id.
51. Kravitz v. State, 8 Cal. App. 3d 301, 87 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970); Hernandez v. State,
11 Cal. App. 3d 895, 90 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1970).
52. Buford v. State, 104 Cal. App. 3d 811, 164 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1980).
53. Kravitz, 8 Cal. App. 3d 301, 87 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970); Hernandez, 11 Cal. App.
3d 895, 90 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1970).
54. 8 Cal. App. 3d 301, 87 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970).
55. Id. at 303, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
56. Id. at 303, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54.
57. Id. at 304, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 354. Section 6761 (now a part of section 7375) of the
Welfare and Institutions Code provides for prior court approval of the release of a patient
committed under section 1026 of the Penal Code. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7375 (West
1984).
58. Kravitz, 8 Cal. App. 3d at 304, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1984). Section 1026 (now section 1026.2) provides
that either the committed individual or the director of the treatment facility may petition for
1989]
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this report and a report from the patient's previous hospital, the
court ordered Toce released.6" Toce killed the plaintiffs' child.6"
Plaintiffs alleged that the state and hospital staff members
"negligently and carelessly provided incomplete and inaccurate infor-
mation concerning their testing, evaluation, [and] treatment" of
Toce, and that their daughter's death resulted from this negligence.62
The Kravitz court discussed two ways in which a mental patient can
be released from a public mental health facility in California. First,
under California Penal Code section 1026(a), the court may order
the release of the patient if the patient or superintendent applies to
the court and the court finds that the patient's sanity has been re-
stored.63 Second, a person committed under chapter 6, title 10, part 2
of the Penal Code may be released by the superintendent with the
approval of the superior court from which the patient was
committed.64
The Kravitz court held that no statutory duty requires the facil-
ity to furnish reports on the condition of a person committed under
Penal Code section 1026 to the court.65 It also determined that under
Government Code section 855.6, the examining psychiatrists were
immune from liability because the superintendent's decision to re-
lease Toce was a discretionary function.66
In a similar wrongful death case, Hernandez v. State,67 the
California Court of Appeals relied on section 856(a)(3) of the Tort
Claims Act to deny a claim of negligent maintenance of records. 68
The court determined that the statute created absolute immunity
release to the superior court of the county where the commitment was made based on the
ground that sanity has been restored. However, no release hearing will take place unless the
individual has been confined or on an outpatient status for at least ninety days. Id. § 1062.2
(West Supp. 1989).
60. Kravitz, 8 Cal. App. 3d at 304, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
61. Id. at 303, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
62. Id. at 304, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
63. Id. at 305, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
64. Id. The court stated that although reports are required to be furnished in other
cases, no statutory duty exists under section 1026 of the Penal Code. Pursuant to a section
1026 proceeding, the court may "request or order the production of evidence, reports or infor-
mation." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 306-07, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56.
67. 11 Cal. App. 3d 895, 90 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1970).
68. Section 856(a)(3) of the California Government Code provides: "Neither a public
entity nor a public employee acting within the scope of his employment is liable for any injury
resulting from determining in accordance with any applicable enactment: . . . . Whether to
parole, grant a leave of absence to, or release a person confined for mental illness or addic-
tion." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 856(a)(3) (West 1980).
[Vol. 29
PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES
from the charge of negligent maintenance of records brought against
both the state and its employees. 9 The court examined two primary
policy considerations in reaching its decision that the facility must be
immune from liability.
First, the court noted that the study of psychosis7" is relatively
new and that the standards of diagnosis and treatment utilized in the
field are not as clear as are those used in connection with physical
illnesses.7 Second, the Hernandez court recognized that public
mental hospitals must accommodate all patients committed to their
care and that, unlike private hospitals, they do not enjoy the luxury
of refusing treatment to mental patients.72 The majority acknowl-
edged that supervision and treatment problems exist because of an
excessive number of patients housed in the public facility.7" The
court therefore held that there should be no tort liability for a public
facility that decides to parole or release persons it deems
rehabilitated.7 '
In reaching its decision, the Hernandez court also looked to the
legislative intent behind the Tort Claims Act. The court noted that
the California Legislature intended to encourage "free release from
confinement, unfettered by the possibility of charges of negligence
against those who participate in the process leading to release." 75
The majority seemed concerned that liability for improper patient
release would inhibit the speed and frequency with which some pa-
tients are released.
76
In Buford v. State, the plaintiffs alleged negligence77 against
the County of Tulare and Atascadero State Hospital.78 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeals again held that the county was under no duty
69. Hernandez, 11 Cal. App. 3d at 898, 90 Cal. Rptr. 207.
70. Webster's Dictionary defines psychotic as "of, relating to, or marked by psychosis,"
whereas psychosis is "profound disorganization of mind, personality, or behavior that results
from an individual's inability to tolerate the demands of his social environment whether be-
cause of the enormity of the imposed stress or because of primary inadequacy or acquired
debility of his organism. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1833-34 (1967).
71. Hernandez, 11 Cal. App. 3d at 898, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 899, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
75. Id. at 901, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
76. Id.
77. A negligence case generally involves five elements: (1) a defendant's legal.duty to
exercise due care, (2) defendant's breach of that duty, (3) the breach of duty as the actual
cause of the plaintiff's injury, (4) the breach as the proximate cause of the injury, and (5)
damages to the plaintiff. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 143-44 (4th ed. 1971).
78. 104 Cal. App. 3d 811, 164 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1980).
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to control the actions of a former state mental patient.79 Additionally,
the court determined that the state was immune from liability under
the tort immunity statute. 0
The Buford case arose after Kenneth Daniels was released
from Atascadero State Hospital in 1976.81 Approximately two years
after his release, he kidnapped the three plaintiffs from a tavern and
held them at knifepoint.82 In its decision, the Buford court reiterated
the general rule that no person owes a duty to control the conduct of
others.8" It noted, however, that exceptions to this rule have been
created in cases where the defendant stands in some special relation-
ship to either the person whose conduct requires control or to the
foreseeable victim of the proposed conduct."4
The Buford court examined the factually similar case of Mc-
Dowell v. County of Alameda,85 where no such special relationship
between the defendant and the victim had been found. McDowell in-
volved a county hospital that had diagnosed an individual as danger-
ous to himself and others.86 Upon learning that the individual, Greg-
ory Jones, was entitled to free medical services at Kaiser Hospital,
doctors at the county hospital sent Jones to Kaiser in a taxi.87 Jones
never arrived. Two days later, Jones shot and killed John McDow-
ell."8 In finding that no special relationship existed between the
county and the victim, the McDowell court reasoned:
There is no allegation that [the dangerous individual] was a
79. Id.
80. Id. at 829, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
81. Id. at 815, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 266. The patient's release was originally an "indefinite
leave of absence." Seventeen months later, that status was changed to an "unauthorized leave
of absence." Id. The nature of the numerous offenses that led to the patient's commitment
were unknown at the time of the filing of the complaint. Id.
82. d.
83. Id. at 820, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 268-69.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. 88 Cal. App. 3d 321, 151 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1979). In McDowell, the county hospital
determined that unless the patient received treatment, he would be dangerous to himself and
others. Although the patient was eligible for services under the Kaiser Hospital Health Plan,
Kaiser refused to send an ambulance. The county hospital then sent the patient to Kaiser in a
taxi, but he never arrived. Id. at 324, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 781. The court held that no "special
relationship" existed between the county hospital and either their patient or the decedent. Id.
at 325, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 781-82. The court applied section 856 to provide absolute immunity
to the hospital. The majority also determined that the hospital had not been negligent: they
had acted reasonably and with due care when they put the patient into a taxicab. Id. at 327,
151 Cal. Rptr. at 783.





threat to the decedent, nor is there any allegation that any par-
ticular person or group of people would be harmed by the re-
lease of [the dangerous individual]. Respondents do not owe a
duty to society because [the dangerous individual's] behavior
may constitute a danger to any person.89
The Buford court, while acknowledging the McDowell decision,
analyzed whether the plaintiffs could state causes of action against
the county and state. The majority first examined the relationship
between the county and Daniels, distinguishing it from the special
relationship found in Tarasojj'0 by looking to the degree of depen-
dence or mutual dependence in the relationship. The court held that
Daniels had not depended in any way on county personnel.91 The
county only "provided services to respond to Daniels' drunk driving
problem, rather than to cure his so-called psychotic criminal tenden-
cies." 92 The majority determined that the county probation depart-
ment had had no way to determine that Daniels was a foreseeable
peril to the neighboring community.9 3 Since no special relationship
existed, the county was under no duty to control Daniels' actions.9
The Buford court next examined whether the state owed a duty
of due care to the plaintiff based on a special relationship to the
defendant. They noted that a duty to help or protect is increasingly
being recognized in special, dependent relationships-even in a rela-
tionship with a public entity."' The court determined that the nature
of the relationship between Atascadero State Hospital and Daniels
was a dependent one.96 Daniels was assigned to various personnel
who were to aid in his rehabilitation during both his commitment
and leave of absence.97 Therefore, the relationship in question was
89. Id. at 325, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 781-82.
90. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); see supra notes 39-50 and
accompanying text.




95. Id. at 823, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 271 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Harland v. State, 75
Cal. App. 3d 475, 142 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1977). In Harland the appellate court held that a
special relationship did exist between the California Veteran's Home (the Home) and a resi-
dent of that Home, Edgmon, who killed two individuals in an auto accident. Id. at 481, 142
Cal. Rptr. at 204. After finding the existence of a special relationship, the court determined
that a jury could reasonably have found that the Home knew that Edgmon was dangerous to
others when driving. However, the court held that liability against the Home could not be
sustained since they had no valid legal reason for restraining Edgmon's right to drive. Id. at
482, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
96. Buford, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
97. Id.
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the type for which other cases had found a duty as a matter of law."8
Warning foreseeable victims about Daniels' release was part of the
duty imposed in other cases.99The Buford court next discussed state immunity statutes. The
state contended that it was immune from liability under either sec-
tion 856.2100 or section 856101 of the California Government Code.1 °
The majority held that neither section granted immunity because the
case involved the negligent supervision of the defendant after his re-
lease for a leave of absence, and section 856 covered only the discre-
tionary decision to grant the leave.' 03 No portion of the statute re-
garded the ministerial actions that followed release.'0 4 Section 856.2
was deemed inapplicable because Daniels was not an escapee108
The Buford court then raised the possibility of immunity under
section 854.8.'0 The court cited the Legislative Committee's Com-
ment on this section: "the section provides public entities with immu-
nity from liability for injuries proximately caused by persons com-
mitted or admitted to mental institutions. "'107 Following the statutory
interpretation in a factually similar case,' the Buford court deter-
mined that the state was immunized from liability for the follow-up
98. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
99. Buford, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 272. "Although there are sub-
stantial questions about the foreseeability of potential victims and the reasonableness of making
a public warning about Daniels' release, these are questions for the trier of fact and should not
be resolved against plaintiffs at the complaint stage." Id.
100. California Government Code section 856.2 states, in pertinent part: "(a) Neither a
public entity nor a public employee is liable for:(l) an injury caused by an escaping or escaped
person who has been confined for mental illness or addiction." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 856.2
(West 1980).
101. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 856 (West 1980). See supra note 1.
102. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 825-26, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 272-73.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 825, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
106. Id. at 827, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 273. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 854.8 (West 1980). See
supra note 35.
107. Buford, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 827, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 274 (quoting VAN ALSTYNE,
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY 628 (CEB) (1964)).
108. Guess v. State, 96 Cal. App. 3d 111, 157 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1979). In Guess, a
mental health patient was conditionally released to his mother's care with the stipulation that
she adhere to strict conditions. The patient was required to enter a follow-up program at a
nearby hospital, and that mental health center was required to notify the court if the patient
regressed. Six months after his release, the patient attempted to rob a bank and severely
wounded the plaintiff, an employee. The court interpreted section 854.8 as shielding public
entities from "all direct and vicarious liability for injury proximately caused by a patient of a
mental institution, except for specific 'malpractice' situations." Id. at 119, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
623.
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actions of its employees.1"9
In a related case, the California Court of Appeals held that a
private rehabilitation center owed no duty to a person who was shot
by an escapee."' The superior court admitted the defendant, Lynn
Bentley, to probation on the condition that he enter Synanon, a pri-
vate rehabilitation program, and not leave the program without court
approval."' Five days after entering the program, Bentley escaped
and went on a "crime spree" that included the harming or killing of
several people." 2 Thirteen days after leaving the program, the de-
fendant shot the plaintiff in the arm." 3
The plaintiff in this case argued that the facility was under a
duty to exercise due care in accepting convicted persons to the pro-
gram and to prevent dangerous patients from leaving the center. He
based his argument on two theories. First, plaintiff cited section 449
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides that if the like-
lihood that a third party will act in a certain way is the hazard that
makes the actor negligent, commission of that act by a third party
does not shield the actor from liability."' Second, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that a special relationship existed between Bentley and the de-
fendants: because the facility accepted Bentley as a patient, it had a
duty to prevent him from leaving the program without
authorization."'
The court rejected both theories. It explained that as a general
rule, a person owes no duty to control the conduct of another." 6
Exceptions are realized in instances of special relationships."' The
court looked to policy considerations in determining whether such a
duty existed in the instant case." 8 It recognized two conflicting pol-
109. 104 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829-30, 164 Cal. Rptr. 264, 275 (1980).
110. Beauchene v. Synanon Found., Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 342, 151 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1979).
111. Id. at 345, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
115. Beauchene, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 346-47, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
116. Id. at 347, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
117. Id.
118. Id.
Principal policy considerations in deciding whether a duty exists include "the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the
policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with result-
ing liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance
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icy goals: the public interest in safety from violent assault and the
public policy favoring innovative criminal offender release and reha-
bilitation programs.l"' The court concluded: "[o]f paramount con-
cern is the detrimental effect a finding of liability would have on
prisoner release and rehabilitation programs."120
Applying Government Code section 845.8,121 the court conceded
that the private facility was not a "public entity or public employee"
within the meaning of the section. However, it rationalized that the
same policy considerations that apply to public release programs
should no doubt be applied to private programs.' 22
In another closely related case, Thompson v. County of Ala-
meda,"'28 the Supreme Court of California held that the county was
either statutorily immunized from liability for releasing a juvenile
who subsequently committed a murder or, alternatively, bore no af-
firmative duty that it failed to perform." 4 Within 24 hours of being
released to the custody of his mother, James, the juvenile offender,
sexually assaulted and murdered the plaintiffs' five-year-old son.'2 5
Plaintiffs alleged that the county was aware James had indicated he
would kill a young child in his neighborhood.' 26 The plaintiffs also
argued that the county was "reckless, wanton, and grossly negligent"
in not advising or warning the juvenile's mother, local police, or local
parents of his dangerous propensities.' 27
The Thompson court examined sections 820.2 and 845.8 of the
Government Code to determine whether immunity should be ex-
tended to the county for the allegedly tortious acts. In its discussion,
the court cited Johnson v. State,'28 where the state Youth Authority
placed a sixteen-year-old youth with known homicidal tendencies
into a foster home without notifying the parents of his dangerous
for the risk involved."
(quoting Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100
(1968)).
119. Beauchene, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 347, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 788-89.
120. Id. at 348, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 799 (quoting Whitcombe v. County of Yolo, 73 Cal.
App. 3d 698, 716, 141 Cal. Rptr. 189, 199 (1977)).
121. The code states, in pertinent part: "Neither a public entity nor a public employee
is liable for: (a) any injury resulting from determining whether to parole or release a pris-
oner." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845.8 (West 1980).
122. Beauchene, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
123. 27 Cal. 3d 741: 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980).
124. Id. at 758, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
125. Id. at 746, 614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
126. Id.
127. Id.




The Johnson court initially found that a special relationship ex-
isted between the state's Youth Authority and its selected foster par-
ents "such that its duty extended to warning of latent, dangerous
qualities suggested by the parolee's history or character."12 It then
turned to the issue of whether the state was immune under sections
820.2 and 845.8 of the Government Code. The majority stated that
the Youth Authority's power to warn was neither "a discretionary
function" nor "the type of basic policy decision that the Government
Code seeks to insulate from liability in section 820.2. ' ' In examin-
ing section 845.8, it also held that immunity extended to decisions to
release or parole, but no further-"subsequent negligent actions,
such as the failure to give reasonable warnings to the foster parents
...are subject to legal redress." ''
Although the Thompson plaintiffs relied heavily on both John-
son and Tarasoff,"2 the court distinguished both cases.' 33 The
Thompson court concluded that, unlike Johnson and Tarasoff, the
plaintiffs in Thompson failed to allege that a relationship existed be-
tween the decedent and the county.3 4 The plaintiffs also failed to
claim that the deceased was a foreseeable victim. " " The majority
did, however, note the county's obligation to exercise reasonable care
to protect all of its citizens. " ' But it refused to impose liability for a
failure to warn the plaintiffs, neighborhood parents, or the police."
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Tobriner argued that the major-
ity had misinterpreted the Government Code and created an immu-
nity the Legislature did not intend." He contended that the county
was in a special relationship with the juvenile and that thus statutory
immunity should not be applied. " 9
Justice Tobriner interpreted Johnson and Tarasoff to state that
a special relationship establishes a duty to use reasonable care to
129. Id. at 785, 447 P.2d at 355, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
130. Id. at 786-87, 793, 447 P.2d at 355-56, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 243-44, 248.
131. Id. at 798-99, 447 P.2d at 364, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
132. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14 (1976). See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
133. Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 750-51, 614 P.2d 728, 733, 167
Cal. Rptr. 70, 75 (1980).




138. Id. at 759, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
139. Id.
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avert danger to foreseeable victims.' 4° The juvenile in Thompson had
threatened to "take the life of a young child in the neighborhood."''
Tobriner argued that even if the victim were not specifically identifi-
able, a duty of reasonable care still existed." 2 Justice Tobriner also
argued that even if warning an entire neighborhood were not feasi-
ble, a warning to the juvenile's mother would be both practical and
effective." 3 Since the juvenile's mother was his legal guardian, she
could attempt to control his behavior and at least ensure that her son
was not left alone with young children."
Apart from Justice Tobriner's views, the decision in Thompson
exemplifies each case involving mental health patients that has been
decided in California since the passing of the California Tort Claims
Act. No California court has found a public entity liable for the re-
lease of a mental health patient who subsequently harms another
individual."" However, the trend in federal cases has been quite
different." 6
D. Federal Law
Federal cases, in contrast to California cases, have often held
public or government-run mental health facilities liable for negli-
gence in the release or leave of absence of patients."" Suits are fre-
quently brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act."" Federal
courts have assigned liability on the basis of (1) a failure to warn,
(2) a statutory duty to protect the public, and (3) forseeability of
harm. The following cases illustrate the rationale of the federal
courts.
In an early case, Fair v. United States,"9 an Air Force officer
was released after a cursory and inadequate psychiatric examina-
tion.150 The officer, Captain Haywood, had previously threatened to
140. Id. at 760, 614 P.2d at 739, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
141. Id. at 759, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
142. Id. at 760, 614 P.2d at 739, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
143. Id. at 764, 614 P.2d at 741, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
144. Id.
145. Kravitz v. State, 8 Cal. App. 3d 301, 87 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970); Hernandez v.
State, 11 Cal. App. 3d 895, 90 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1970); Beauchene v. Synanon Found., Inc., 88
Cal. App. 3d 342, 151 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1979).
146. Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956); Williams v. United States,
450 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1978); Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
147. Fair, 234 F.2d at 288; Williams, 450 F. Supp. at 1040; Hicks, 551 F.2d at 407.
148. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).




kill a nurse, a base commander, and the provost marshal.151 The
Captain's homicidal tendencies were known to the staff of the Air
Force hospital who treated him.' Upon release, the patient shot a
nurse, two guards, and then himself.'53 The Fair court held that the
government could be liable because the provost marshal, who had
promised to warn the nurse of the patient's release, failed to fulfill
his promise."5 4 The court stated further that the United States Gov-
ernment had waived immunity under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.' 55 Specifically, when the government undertakes an action, it
must do so with due care. 56
In Williams v. United States,'57 also brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the United States District Court of South Dakota
assigned liability for failure to warn of the release of a patient the
defendants knew to be dangerous.' 58 Alonzo Bush had a history of
violence-officials at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Fort
Meade where he was committed considered him "fairly danger-
ous."' 59 Nonetheless, on the basis of two meetings and a fifteen min-
ute scan of his past records, doctors at Fort Meade released him
without notifying officials, although they had promised to do so.'6
On the day following his release, Bush, intoxicated, shot in the head
a man he thought was trying to kill him.' 6 '
The Williams court stated that although mental disorders are
"elusive," and that imposing liability on a hospital might prove bur-
densome, hospitals that treat patients with behaviorial disorders are
not shielded from liability in all instances for the improvident release
of patients."' The court phrased the standard of reasonable care as
follows:
When the risk becomes a serious one, either because the
threatened harm is great or because there is an especial likeli-
hood that it will occur, reasonable care may demand precautions
against 'that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary
151. Id. at 290.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 296.
155. Id. at 294.
156. Id.
157. 450 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1978).
158. Id. at 1046.
159. Id. at 1042.
160. Id. at 1043.
161. Id. at 1044.
162. Id.
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incidents of human life and therefore to be anticipated.'""3
The majority held that a duty was imposed upon the Fort Meade
V.A. Hospital to exercise reasonable care to see that the promised
notification was provided. 64 Since the hospital failed to notify, it was
negligent. The court reasoned that it was entirely foreseeable, given
Bush's history of violence, that he might make a violent attack upon
another." 5
The court in Semler v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington 6'
relied upon section 319 Restatement (Second) of Torts in holding
that a psychiatric institute was under a duty to protect the public
from the reasonably foreseeable risk of harm from a patient with a
history of molestation. 67 The patient had been sentenced to 20
years' imprisonment for the abduction of a young girl.' 66 A judge
suspended the sentence on the condition that Gilreath, the defendant,
continue his treatment at a psychiatric institute where he had spent
time pending trial.' 9 Gilreath was subsequently transferred to out-
patient status without the court's notification. 7 ' Approximately one
month later, Gilreath killed the plaintiff's daughter.17 ' The court of
appeals held that the lower court order had imposed a duty on the
mental health facility to protect the public by retaining custody over
Gilreath.171 It also held that the facility breached this duty and that
the breach proximately resulted in the death of the decedent.'78 The
psychiatric facility and the probation officer thus both owed damages
to the plaintiff for the death of the girl.' 74
In Hicks v. United States,' 75 the United States Court of Ap-
peals affirmed a finding of negligence against St. Elizabeths Hospital
(St. Elizabeths).' 7 The plaintiffs, relatives of the deceased, brought
the action under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 77 The Hicks case
presented the following factual basis. Joseph Morgan had been con-
163. Id. at 1045 (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 171 (4th ed. 1971)).
164. Id. at 1044-45.
165. Id.
166. 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976).
167. Id. at 127.
168. Id. at 123.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 123-24.
171. Id. at 124.
172. Id. at 125.
173. Id. at 126.
174. Id. at 121.
175. 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
176. Id. at 421-22.
177. Id. at 409.
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fined to St. Elizabeths for severe mental impairment caused by ex-
cessive drinking.178  He repeatedly assaulted his wife and had
threatened to murder her.1 9 After being arrested on assault charges,
Morgan was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to
St. Elizabeths.' 80 Two months after he was committed, the senior
psychiatric resident recommended his discharge.18' The report stated
that the patient had recovered from the mental disorder that had
been caused by alcohol intake and was competent to stand trial. 8 '
Three months later, the patient was released.' 83
Shortly before Morgan's discharge, his family visited him at St.
Elizabeths.8  At that time, Morgan threatened to kill his wife."'
He blamed her for his commitment.'8 Two months after his release,
he shot and killed her at their family home.
187
The Hicks court made no decision as to whether St. Elizabeths
owed a duty of care to Mrs. Morgan. It did determine, however, that
St. Elizabeths owed a duty to the Court of General Sessions. 88 The
standard applied by the majority was the degree of care a reasonably
prudent person would have employed in like circumstances.' 89 Al-
though the court took into account that psychiatric analyses contain a
degree of uncertainty, they determined that the mistake in this in-
stance was a quite serious error.' 90
The court held that under a local rule, 24 D.C. Code 301(b),
St. Elizabeths had a legal duty to inform the court if, in its opinion,
a patient accused of a crime is competent to stand trial. 9 ' Because
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 409-10.






187. Id. at 412.
188. Id. at 415. The District of Columbia Court of General Sessions received the letter
from St. Elizabeths Hospital. The letter stated that Morgan had "recovered" from his mental
disorder. Id. at 415-16.
189. Id. at 416.
190. Id. at 417.
191. Id. at 415 (emphasis added). 24 D.C. Code 301(b) states:
Whenever an accused person confined to a hospital for the mentally ill is re-
stored to mental competency in the opinion of the superintendent of said hospi-
tal, the superintendent shall certify such fact to the clerk of the court in which
the indictment, information, or charge against the accused is pending and such
certification shall be sufficient to authorize the court to enter an order thereon
adjudicating him to be competent to stand trial . . ..
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the hospital stated, without reservation, that the patient had recov-
ered, the court determined that the hospital had exceeded its author-
ity. 9 2 The opinion also stated that St. Elizabeths had failed to give
the court enough information to make its own informed decision. 9
The Hicks court determined that the hospital's negligence was a sub-
stantial factor in the release of Mr. Morgan. 9 It also concluded
that Mrs. Morgan's death was foreseeable under the
circumstances.'96
In Underwood v. United States,'96 the plaintiff brought an ac-
tion under the Federal Tort Claims Act.' 97 The plaintiff alleged that
a mentally ill individual had negligently been discharged from Air
Force hospitalization and had returned to duty without having any
restrictions placed upon him.' 99 In this case, the mentally ill individ-
ual, Mr. Dunn, was hospitalized after assaulting his wife.' 9 The
doctor in charge determined that Mr. Dunn had the potential for
violent behavior. 00 The head doctor was transferred, however, and
the new psychiatrist never received the prior diagnosis of the pa-
tient.2O' The new psychiatrist returned Dunn to duty, where he had
access to weapons.2"' Three weeks later, Dunn shot his wife with a
gun that he had taken from the weapons room.203
The Underwood court held that the United States owed a duty
to Mrs. Dunn to not act negligently.0 4 Discharging Dunn from the
psychiatric clinic and returning him to duty without recommenda-
tions to restrain his access to firearms was negligent because the
therapists failed to adequately explore Dunn's psychiatric history.20'
The court also held that Dunn's return to duty was not a discretion-
ary function on the part of the officers of the United States Air Force
and thus did not fall within the exception to the Federal Tort
24 D.C. CODE § 301(b) (1973).
192. Hicks, 511 F.2d at 415-16.
193. Id. at 419.
194. Id. at 421.
195. Id. at 421-22.
196. 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966).
197. Id. at 94.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 95.
200. Id. at 95-96.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 94.
204. Id. at 99.
205. Id. at 98.
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Claims Act.2"6
In Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 207 suit was brought against
Sears for allegedly selling a shotgun to a mentally defective individ-
ual. When Sears sought contribution from the United States, plain-
tiffs20. sued the United States, as well as Sears.20 9 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the Veteran's Administration Hospital (the V.A. Hospital)
was negligent in failing to detain or begin civil commitment proceed-
ings against the mental health patient, Ulysses L. Cribbs.21°
Mr. Cribbs purchased a gun in 1977.11 Prior to that time, he
had been receiving treatment at the V.A. Hospital.212 After obtaining
the gun, he resumed psychiatric day care treatment at the V.A. Hos-
pital. 3 One month later, he voluntarily removed himself from treat-
ment, against the wishes of his physicians.214 Shortly thereafter, he
entered a crowded nightclub and fired into the crowd, killing Dennis
Lipari and wounding Ruth Ann Lipari.21 6
Plaintiffs alleged that the V.A. Hospital's treatment of Mr.
Cribbs was negligent because the hospital knew or should have
known that Mr. Cribbs was dangerous. 2"' The plaintiffs argued that
the hospital failed to take measures that a reasonable mental health
practitioner would have taken.2"
First, the Lipari court looked to whether a cause of action could
be stated under the Federal Tort Claims Act." The court acknowl-
edged the common law rule that a person owes no duty to prevent a
206. Id. at 94. 28 U.S.C. 2680(a) (1982) states, as exceptions to instances of liability for
the United States:
The provisions of this chapter ...shall not apply to-(a) Any claim based
upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care,
in the execution of a statute or regulation, . . . or based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
207. 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
208. Plaintiffs are Ruth Ann Lipari and the estate of Dennis Lipari, deceased. Id. at
187.
209. Id. at 187.
210. Id. at 186.






217. Id. at 186.
218. Id. at 188. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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third party from harming another. 19 However, the court cited Re-
statement (Second) of Torts section 315 and recognized that a special
relationship between a psychotherapist and his patient could justify
imposing an affirmative duty on the therapist to control his patient's
behavior."2 °
The majority analogized the psychiatrist's duty to act to a situa-
tion where an affirmative duty is placed on a doctor to disclose his
patient's contagious disease.22' In the latter case, a duty would be
imposed even though it destroyed the confidentiality of the doctor-
patient relationship. 222 The United States argued that it should not
be liable under such a theory because mental illnesses are more diffi-
cult to diagnose than physical illnesses.22' Dangerousness is espe-
cially difficult to predict.224
Although the Lipari court acknowleged that predictions of dan-
gerousness are difficult, it declined to use that consideration to justify
denying the injured party relief regardless of the circumstances.225 A
therapist is not liable for any harm committed by his patient; liabilty
only occurs when the therapist's negligence causes the injury in
2261question.
The majority limited the therapist's liability to persons
foreseeably endangered by the hospital's negligent conduct. 227 For
the hospital to be liable, plaintiffs must prove that the hospital could
have "reasonably foreseen an unreasonable risk of harm to the
Liparis or a class of persons of which the Liparis were members. '228
The Lipari court concluded that Sears could seek contribution from
the United States since the negligent acts of the two defendants com-
bined to cause the same injury.229
These cases provide an overview of federal law. To summarize
the content of this section, according to existing California law, pub-
lic health entities will not be held liable for the tortious acts of the
patients they release unless the court finds that the injury was proxi-
219. Id.
220. Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 188-89 (D. Neb. 1980). See
supra note 46.
221. Id. at 191.
222. Id. at 191.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 192.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 194.
228. Id. at 194-95.
229. Id. at 196-97.
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mately caused by an employee's negligence. No California public
mental health facility has been found liable under this theory since
the passing of the California Tort Claims Act. Injuries to innocent
parties that continue unredressed are the result of this position.
In contrast, federal law consistently holds public mental health
facilities liable for their patients' actions. Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the United States Government is subject to liability to
the same extent as are private parties. As a result of this stance,
determinations of whether negligence cause the injury in question
are made and any damage sustained by the complaining party is
compensated.
The problem is that California law does not recognize liability
on the part of public mental health facilities or employees for impru-
dent decisions to release mental health employees. However, accord-
ing to Government Code section 856(d), a public employee is not to
be exonerated if it is determined that an injury was proximately
caused by his negligent conduct or wrongful act or omission. Califor-
nia cases, unlike federal cases, have been reluctant to find negligence
on the part of the public hospital employee. This result has often
been based on both the lack of a special relationship between the
patient and employee or hospital and the ensuing determination that
the acts of the patient were not foreseeable to the hospital.
III. ANALYSIS
According to existing California law, a public mental health fa-
cility is immune from liability for harm cased by a released mental
patient-the injury will be redressed only if the actions of a public
employee are found to have been negligent.2 30 California cases
rarely, if ever, have found negligence on the part of those employ-
ees. 3 If the same factual settings were analyzed under federal law,
it is much more likely that a finding of negligence and thus liability
would be made. One court noted, "[i]n analyzing this issue, we bear
in mind that legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but
merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, lia-
bility should be imposed for damage done." ' Through its immunity
230. See supra note I and accompanying text.
231. See Kravitz v. State, 8 Cal. App. 3d 301, 87 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970) (denying an
action for the negligent maintenance of a mental health patient's records); Buford v. State, 104
Cal. App. 3d 811, 164 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1980) (denying an action for negligence against a
mental health facility whose released patient subsequently kidnapped three victims).
232. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976). See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
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statute, California decided that public mental health facilties owe no
duty to either foreseeable victims or to society as a whole. But duty is
a legal concept that must change and grow to meet the needs and
expectations of society.
The same rationale that led to the Muskopf and Lipman deci-
sions is valid today. The Muskopf court pointed out that the rule of
governmental immunity for tort has no "rational basis, and has ex-
isted only by the force of inertia."2 ' In dicta, the Lipman court indi-
cated that it would be "unjust in some circumstances to require an
individual injured by official wrongdoing to bear the burden of his
loss rather than distribute it throughout the community."23 These
cases affirm the policy that if negligence is found, damages should be
paid to the injured party.
In Hernandez v. State,235 the court held that the public health
facility was immune from liability. It based its decision on California
Government Code section 856(a)(3), but was strongly influenced by
both the fact that diagnosing psychoses is difficult and that public
hospitals must accept all patients committed to their care.23 Under
federal law, it is clear that this case would have resulted in liability
for the facility, since the federal rule states that if an employee's
negligent act results in another person's subsequent injury, the pub-
lic facility will be held liable.23 ' The Hernandez court stated: "the
immunity granted by Section 856 is absolute and not subject to qual-
ification by the negligence of [subordinates]." '238 However, the court
consciously disregarded the fact that liability could be imposed under
section 856 for the failure to use reasonable care or if the act or
omission is a departure from a defined standard of care.239 The re-
sult was an erroneous conclusion that no liability existed on the part
of the state or its employees.24
In Buford v. State,241 it was determined that a special relation-
ship existed between the mentally ill individual, Kenneth Daniels,
and Atascadero State Hospital. The court, however, declined to
233. 55 Cal. 2d at 216, 359 P.2d at 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
234. 55 Cal. 2d at 230, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
235. 11 Cal. App. 3d 895, 90 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1970). See supra notes 67-76 and accom-
panying text.
236. Hernandez, 11 Cal. App. 3d at 895, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
237. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). See supra note 2.
238. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 898, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
239. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 856, Law Revision Comm'n Comment, 1963 Addition (West
1980).
240. Hernandez, 11 Cal. App. 3d at 899, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
241. 104 Cal. App. 3d 811, 164 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1980).
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reach the issue of foreseeability, stating that the issue is a question of
fact that should not be resolved against plaintiffs at the complaint
stage.24 However, before resolving the foreseeability issue, the court
determined that the hospital was immune under section 854.843 If a
finding of forseeability had been made, the hospital would have been
negligent by failing to warn foreseeable victims of the patient's
release.
The hospital's actions in Buford would have been deemed neg-
ligent in a federal court. According to federal cases, the hospital
owed the plaintiff the duty to prevent harm to foreseeable victims
because a special relationship existed between Atascadero State Hos-
pital and their mentally ill patient. There was a breach of that duty
when the Hospital failed to notify authorities or take other reasona-
ble actions to apprehend Daniels. Further, the hospital's actions
were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury and the plaintiff
suffered actual damages.
The situation in Buford is similar to situations in federal cases
where the government has been held liable for a failure to warn. For
example, in both the Fair244 and Williams cases,2" liability was
found because the hospital knew of a patient's dangerous tendencies
yet failed to notify foreseeably threatened parties. Likewise in
Buford, the hospital knew that the status of their patient was an
"unauthorized leave of absence, 246 yet failed to warn authorities
who could have aided them in the matter.
The California case of McDowell v. County of Alameda 7 in-
volved a county hospital that would have been held negligent for its
actions under the federal criteria. In McDowell, the county hospital
diagnosed an individual as constituting a danger to himself and
others, yet sent the patient to a private hospital in a taxicab. Al-
though the patient was never admitted to the county hospital, that
hospital did make a diagnosis regarding the individual's state of
mind. In this case, under the federal standard, a determination of
liability would be based on whether the court found the existence of
a special relationship. Since the hospital did make a diagnosis and
242. Id. at 824, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
243. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 854.8 (West 1980). Buford, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 164
Cal. Rptr. at 275.
244. 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956).
245. 450 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1978).
246. 104 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
247. 88 Cal. App. 3d 321, 151 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1979). See supra note 85 and accompa-
nying text.
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because the patient's dangerousness was determined, the hospital es-
tablished a relationship with the individual. Once a special relation-
ship is created, the mental health facility has a responsibility to act
as a reasonable practitioner would have acted in similar circum-
stances.2 " Placing a confirmed mentally ill, dangerous individual in
a taxi to be sent across town for further medical treatment is not
reasonable conduct because it is foreseeable that the unsupervised in-
dividual will escape and cause subsequent harm.
In Beauchene,24 9 a California court refused to recognize the ex-
istence of a special relationship, even though the private facility in-
volved had assumed care of the individual, because the court found
that the respondent owed no duty to the appellant.2 50 However, the
existence of a special relationship should be determined without ref-
erence to whether any general duty is present. A special relationship
creates an exception to the general rule that no duty exists for one
party to control the conduct of another party."5 Since a special rela-
tionship did exist between Synanon and its patient, and because the
facility voluntarily assumed control of a known criminal, the facility
owed a duty to prevent their inmate from leaving the program.
The Beauchene decision balanced two conflicting policy goals:
(1) the interest in public safety, and (2) the interest in rehabilitative
programs for criminals and those with character disorders.252 The
court determined that rehabilitative programs are so vital that each
member of society must accept the risk presented by a released pa-
tient. It held that the same policy goals that led the Legislature to
enact section 845.8 of the California Government Code253 to protect
public facilities must also be extended to private facilities.254 This
view is unsound.
Certainly, rehabilitative programs are important. But public
safety should be given greater priority. The Tort Claims Act was
never meant to allow facilities to release patients negligently and re-
main free from liability.255 Society should not be subjected to a risk
248. See also Williams, 450 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1978); Fair, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir.
1956).
249. 88 Cal. App. 3d 342, 151 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1979).
250. Id. at 347, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
251. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
252. 88 Cal. App. 3d at 347, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 798-99.
253. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 845.8 (West 1980).
254. Beauchene, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
255. "The 1963 Tort Claims Act did not alter the basic teaching of [MuskopJl: 'when
there is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity is the exception.' " Johnson v. California, 69
Cal. 2d 782, 798, 447 P.2d 352, 363, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 251 (1968).
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of harm over which it has no control. Many public health facility
inmates have committed crimes. Society should not be put at risk for
the benefit of those who may have broken the law in the past.
The factual situation in Johnson25 was very similar to cases
where a mental health patient is released and causes subsequent
harm. Yet in Johnson, liability was assigned, whereas in past Cali-
fornia mental health cases, damages have not been awarded to a
plaintiff injured by a released patient. 57 The Johnson court deter-
mined that a special relationship existed between the juvenile delin-
quent and the state Youth Authority. Because of of this special rela-
tionship, the court held that the Youth Authority had a duty to warn
foreseeable victims of Johnson's violent tendencies.258 This relation-
ship is virtually identical to the relationship between county or state
mental facilities and their patients. The Youth Authority had impor-
tant information about the juvenile's violent background. Because of
their contact with and study of mental health patients, employees of
mental health facilities obtain the same type of information as the
Youth Authority. Both relationships study the individuals in their
care and work to rehabilitate them so that they may become produc-
tive members of society.
Because of the existence of a special relationship between a
public mental health facility and its patients, the facility should
maintain a duty to protect society from potentially violent acts com-
mitted by the patients. The facility should be held to a reasonable
standard of care. As the Johnson court stated:
[A]lthough a basic policy decision (such as standards for parole)
may be discretionary and hence warrant governmental immu-
nity, subsequent ministerial actions in the implementation of
that basic decision still must face case-by-case adjudication on
the question of negligence. Indeed, most of these cases, like the
instant situation, involve failure to warn of foreseeable, latent
See also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 856, Law Revision Comm'n Comment, 1963 Addition
(West 1980):
The section also declares an immunity from liability for carrying out with due
care the discretionary determinations that are made. Liability may be imposed,
however, for failure to use reasonable care in carrying out whatever determina-
tion has been made, for the act or omission causing injury in this case would be
a departure from a defined standard of care.
256. 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
257. Kravitz v. State, 8 Cal. App. 3d 301, 87 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970); Hernandez v.
State, 11 Cal. App. 3d 895, 90 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1970); Beauchene, 88 Cal. App. 3d 342, 151
Cal. Rptr. 796 (1979).
258. Johnson, 69 Cal. 2d at 786, 447 P.2d at 355, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
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dangers flowing from the basic, immune decision."
The Johnson court's analysis was correct and logical-it points
out many of the flaws inherent in extending immunity to California
facilities through the California Tort Claims Act.
IV. PROPOSAL
The inconsistency between California and federal law has cre-
ated a need for a re-examination of the application of existing Cali-
fornia law. Although liability could be assigned under California law
if a public employee were found to be negligent in releasing a mental
health patient, such a finding has not been made since the California
Tort Claims Act was passed.
In order to win a damages award for a client harmed by an
improvidently released mental patient, an attorney must prove that a
public employee's acts were negligent. An attorney could compare
federal and California decisions and argue that the federal position
should be followed, even though California public mental health em-
ployees have not been found negligent in the past. Further, the attor-
ney could explain that Government Code section 856 causes judges
to avoid finding negligence on the part of the facility itself and on
the part of the employee, a result that certainly was not the purpose
of the code section. The purpose of the code section was to immunize
public entities from liability. As originally drafted, however, the code
section specifically provided instances where liability for employee
negligence would occur.2 6 0 The code section stated that a failure to
use reasonable care in carrying out an action would result in liabil-
ity.281 Therefore, the code section was not intended to protect em-
ployees who act negligently.
California courts should follow federal courts' reasoning and be
more willing to find public employees negligent in the release of
mental health patients. Such a policy would produce more equitable
results for individuals injured by improperly released mental pa-
tients. Under the rationale of Johnson, because the entire population
of California benefits from the existence of mental health facilities, it
should also share equally the burden of injuries negligently inflicted
on individual citizens. As Johnson points out, suits against the state
259. 69 Cal. 2d at 797, 447 P.2d at 362, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 250.





provide a fair and efficient means of distributing losses.262
V. CONCLUSION
In 1963, California passed the California Tort Claims Act, giv-
ing mental health facilities and other public entities immunity from
suit for the improvident release of patients. Under federal law, hos-
pitals are held to the same standard of care for such conduct as are
private individuals. Federal mental health care entities have been
held liable for their negligent acts. No California mental health facil-
ity has been held negligent for the release of a patient since the Tort
Claims Act was passed.
This comment proposes that the results of the California Tort
Claims Act as presently applied are unfair and unintended. The Act
was not meant to shield public health facilities from all liability for
all injuries caused by an improvidently released patient. Yet this has
been its unfortunate result. Judges should be more willing to recog-
nize negligence on the part of a mental health employee if such neg-
ligence actually exists. These findings would lead to a more just and
equitable outcome for all parties involved.
Juliet Virtue
262. 69 Cal. 2d at 797-98, 447 P.2d at 363, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
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